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ABSTRACT
A comparison of the role and performance of SMEs in Korea and Taiwan during the 1990s
and early 2000s shows that the reputation for SMEs to be flexible in the face of adversity is
well deserved, but should not be take for granted. Both Taiwan and Korea have built much of
their economic success on SMEs. Both economies are very open to external shocks; both
were affected by the 1997 Asian Crisis, and to a lesser extent, the “tech wreck” of 2001.
Both economies have faced the need to restructure their industrial competitiveness, and both
have active policies to support entrepreneurship and SMEs. Within this broad context of
similarities, there are also some differences in approach and structure. All of this can give a
better understanding of how managers and policy makers can help to create jobs and build a
more competitive economy.
SMEs provide about 80 percent of private sector employment in both economies, so SME
performance is an important economic and social issue. The paper shows, for example, that
Korean SMEs were subject to rather bigger devaluation shocks and currency volatility than
their Taiwanese counterparts. However SME exporters in both economies showed
considerable resilience in the face of shocks and SMEs in both economies have significantly
improved their liquidity and debt ratios since 1997, suggesting they are better prepared now
than before. They have done so in the face of a sharp decline in bank lending to SMEs. Over
the decade there has been a steady structural decline in the importance of manufacturing
SMEs in both economies.
The paper examines the relative performance of SMEs in Taiwan and Korea over a turbulent
decade, and it examines the SME policies and initiatives adopted. It seeks to extract some
lessons for other economies seeking to develop an entrepreneurial and resilient SME sector in
the face of global turbulence.
* Charles Harvie is Co-Director of the Centre for SME Research and Development, University of Wollongong.
He is currently on secondment at the Hunter Valley Research Foundation, Newcastle, NSW, Australia, where he
is Director of Research.

1. Introduction
Most governments in Asia now face two key policy problems. The first is the creation of
jobs. The second is the creation of an internationally competitive industrial structure. These
two problems are closely linked. Job creation is often necessary to replace jobs lost due to
structural change, international competition, and turbulence from abroad. Job creation was
not a major issue in Asia until the 1997 Asian Crisis. Export led catch-up growth could be
depended on to generate enough jobs to meet political objectives. The collapse of asset
bubbles and the contagion from abroad in 1997 showed a distinctly more negative side of
globalisation, as industrial structures failed to adapt quickly enough and the unemployment
queues grew.
SMEs are generally regarded as being good at job creation, at providing a major source of
competitive renewal for an industrial structure, and at being quick to adapt to changing
circumstances. SMEs are also a significant source of exports. SMEs play an important role in
all the Asian economies, typically contributing over 99 percent of all enterprises, over 60
percent of private sector employment, and about 30 percent or so of exports (Hall (2002)).
Korea and Taiwan were, and still are, leaders in the Asian model of development. Both
economies have been subject to a series of externally imposed “shocks” in the last decade;
the Japanese stagnation starting in 1994, the 1997 Asian Crisis, and the more recent “tech
wreck” of 2001. Both economies have relied heavily on SMEs for their marked success in
development over the last few decades, but they have done so in different ways. Both
economies keep good records of their SME activity. It is thus instructive to look at how the
SMEs in Korea and Taiwan have performed over the last decade or so, because they provide
an almost “laboratory” comparison.
The definition of an SME is similar, but not identical, in Korea and Taiwan. The definitions
are set out in Tables 1 and 2. As can be seen, the upper limit for an SME in manufacturing in
Korea is 300 people employed, while in Taiwan it is 200. For commerce and services the
upper limit of an SME is larger in Taiwan, at 50 employees, than in Korea at 20 employees.
Taiwan does not usually distinguish between small and medium firms in its statistics.
Although these may seem like substantial differences, most SMEs employ less than 10
people. In APEC generally, about 70 to 80 percent of SMEs employ less than 5 people
(APEC 2003). There is only a very small percentage of firms, typically ranging from about 1
percent to about 4 percent, which have more than 100 employees. As a rough rule of thumb it
is useful to see the vast bulk of SMEs as having less than 100 employees, and most have less
than 20 employees.
Table 1: Korea - Definition of an SME

Mining manufacturing and
transportation
Construction
Commerce and other
services

small
50

medium
51 - 300

30
10

31 - 200
11 - 20

1

Table 2: Taiwan - Definition of an SME
Manufacturing,
construction, mining and
quarrying
Commerce Transport and
other Services

employees
<200

operating revenue

<50

< NT $100 million

paid up capital
< NT $80 million

The issue of the contribution and performance of SMEs is of more general interest to other
developing economies, especially those in the Asian region (see Harvie and Lee (2002a,
2002b)). There is a strong commitment to a more open and integrated regional Asian
economy. The accession of China, and Taiwan, to the WTO in 2001 is one important step.
Moves in ASEAN to a free trade grouping by 2005, and of ASEAN plus China are other
examples. This also has to be seen in the broader commitment of APEC members to free
trade for more advanced economies by 2010 and for all members by 2020. All this ensures
that there is a strong commitment to increased integration, trade, investment, and competition
in the region.
In this context there is also a re-appraisal of the Asian Growth and Development Model
(AGDM) taking place. This model traditionally placed considerable importance upon the
development of an export oriented industrial sector; maintenance of macroeconomic stability;
maintenance of relatively stable exchange rates; high saving and investment; close
government-large business-banking relationships; directed credit; and high human capital
(Harvie and Lee (2002)). Some evidence from total factor productivity (TFP) models (Anh
(2001)) suggest that a disproportionate contribution of growth in Asia has tended to come
from increased inputs rather than from increased efficiency. Export growth will still remain
an important aspect of Asian growth, but an increasing proportion will be intra regional trade,
and thus will require continual industrial restructuring and efficiency gains. There is a
recognised need for increased emphasis on efficiency improvements, and greater
competitiveness. What is also recognised is that this has not come from policies directed at
creating large firm conglomerates, or directed finance, or from cronyism. What is now
emerging is a need for a greater emphasis on an “entrepreneurial engine” which requires a
policy and business environment that supports SMEs in a competitive, adaptable and
innovative role. How can Asia encourage a more flexible, competitive, innovative and
efficient industrial structure? The solution is not just to encourage more SMEs at the expense
of large firms. The issues are more complex than that. By understanding better how
Taiwanese and Korean SMEs have performed over the last decade we can get some better
insights as to how to how to develop a better and more entrepreneurial business environment.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, the overall context within which SME development in
Korea and Taiwan has taken place is reviewed. Second, the paper looks at available evidence
on the relative performance of SMEs in Korea and Taiwan, particularly in the context of the
financial and economic crisis of 1997-98. Third, the policy framework for the development of
the SME sector in Korea and Taiwan is compared and contrasted. Finally, a brief summary of
the major conclusions and evidence from this paper is then presented.
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2. The context - the business environment in Korea and Taiwan
The environment in which businesses operate affects their performance, especially in the case
of SMEs that generally have less control over their environment than larger firms. It is widely
accepted that Taiwan’s business environment was affected less by the 1997 Asian Crisis than
that of Korea. A first a priori hypothesis is thus that we should expect that Korea’s SMEs
would be affected much more by the turbulence of the 1997 period. However, all events have
a context, and it is useful to look at the broader context. The business environment ranges
from the broad macro policy settings, to institutional arrangements, to specific micro policy
initiatives. There are some important similarities and differences in the business environment
in Korea and Taiwan, and these are examined briefly below.
It is useful to look at the business environment in three periods: first, from 1990 to the end of
1996, from the beginning of the decade to just before the Asian Crisis in 1997; second from
the Asian Crisis to about the end of 1998, when the Asian Crisis was settling down, and
growth was re-emerging; and third from about 1999 to the beginning of the world downturn
in 2001. In the first period, from 1990 until the end of 1996, the overall business environment
was very conducive for SMEs in both Korea and Taiwan. In both economies GDP growth
was strong, driven by exports and domestic consumption, and inflation low. The Japanese
slowdown was beginning to have an evident effect on exports and investment in the region,
but SMEs and policy makers had time to adjust. In the second period the 1997 crisis affected
Korea much more than Taiwan, both in terms of immediate impact and in terms of
subsequent industrial restructuring. Although in both economies currencies devalued sharply,
and there were interest rate rises and shortages of liquidity in the months immediately
following the crisis, Korean SMEs were affected much more than Taiwanese SMEs. Korean
GDP growth slowed sharply and then accelerated to catch up with Taiwan. Korean SMEs
were subject to a much more turbulent and uncertain business environment than Taiwanese
SMEs. In the third period, from 1999 to end 2000, the economies were moving back into a
more stable growth mode. At the end of this period a fourth period emerges, with the
downturn in the world economy starting with the “tech wreck”. This impacted on the high
tech export oriented manufacturing sector of both Korea and Taiwan. Unfortunately, data for
the period post 2000 is difficult to get at the time of writing, so this fourth period is omitted
from further analysis at this point.
Macro economic context
Both Taiwan and Korea were leaders of the Asian Tigers, and successfully maintained a high
level of GDP growth of around 6 to 8 percent per annum throughout the first half of the
1990s, while at the same time keeping inflation at around 4 percent, and unemployment
below 3 percent (Hsiao and Hsiao (2001), Lee and Rhee (1999)). As can be seen in Figure 1,
Korean GDP growth slipped behind Taiwan’s in 1997 and 1998, but by 2001 Korea had
caught up again and had achieved the same level of growth from 1995 to 2001 as Taiwan.
Exchange rate context
Taiwan moved to a floating exchange rate in 1989, but retained some controls on capital
flows to limit sudden large speculative flows. These were progressively relaxed during the
1990s. The New Taiwan Dollar (NTD) appreciated strongly in the period 1990 to 1995.
Korea moved to a managed exchange rate in the early 1990s, which allowed the rate to be
determined by market forces, but restricted fluctuations to within a band. Korea shifted to a
free-floating exchange rate system on 16 December 1997 as a response to the Asian Crisis
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and rapidly dwindling official reserves. As can be seen in Figure 2 both currencies devalued
relative to the USD (the US being a major trading partner for both economies) in 1997, but
the Korean Won lost more than 40 percdent of its value relative to about half that decline in
the NTD.
Figure 1: GDP Growth in Korea and Taiwan
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Notes: indexed as 1995 = 100
Source: Reserve Bank of Australia, World Bank

Figure 2: Exchange Rate Movements in Korea and Taiwan Relative to the USD
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What is perhaps of more significance is the extent of currency volatility. Figure 3 shows the
extent of volatility as measured by the average range of highest and lowest interbank bids
relative to the average exchange rate for a year. This is only a crude measure of volatility, but
it helps to show that the Korean Won was much more volatile in the 1997/98 period than the
NTD. It subsequently moved back to a volatility similar to that of the NTD.
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Figure 3: Exchange Rate Volatility in Korea and Taiwan (%)
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Note: measured as range for year (highest bid - lowest offer) as a percentage of the mean exchange
rate for the year
Source: OANDA

FDI and foreign debt context
Lee and Rhee (1999, p 59) show that Korea, along with a number of other economies that
were most affected by the contagion of 1997, had a high proportion of short term foreign
debt, and a high ratio of short term foreign debt to foreign exchange reserves. For example, in
1996, Korea had a total foreign debt of USD 99 billion, USD 67 billion of which was in short
term debt, and most of it was held by banks. This was nearly double the level of foreign
exchange reserves. By contrast, Taiwan had only USD 22 billion in foreign debt, and
although it too had a high proportion of short-term debt (USD 18 billion), held mostly by
banks, its total debt was only about 30 percent of its foreign exchange reserves. Whilst this
did not appear to make much difference in borrowing ability until 1997, it had significant
consequences for credit assessments and on banking system liquidity and funds in the period
after 1997. Hsiao and Hsiao (2001) observe that Korea had much higher ratios of foreign
portfolio investment to international reserves throughout the decade compared with those of
Taiwan. “For Korea, the ratio was only 13 percent in 1989, but increased rapidly and reached
a whopping 372 percent in 1997, and then decreased to 145 percent in 1998. This signals the
danger of a currency crisis in won in the case of sudden flight of inward portfolio investment.
For Taiwan, the ratios had maintained at a very low level. They were -0.32 percent in 1989,
and increased slightly and steadily to a mere 15 percent in 1996, well within the 100 percent
threshold level” (ibid p 360).
In the decade prior to 1995 Taiwan had not relied heavily on foreign borrowing to support its
investment, funding it instead from domestic saving. Taiwan had actively encouraged FDI
(foreign direct investment) as a means of acquiring technology and funds, but those funds
were mostly in the form of equity. Korea, by contrast, had relied on borrowing abroad to fill
the gap between domestic saving and investment, which was generally between 1 and 3
percent of GDP. Korea had not channelled this as FDI, but instead had taken funds as debt,
and thus faced much higher burdens when the currency devalued sharply in 1997 Ahn (2001).
In Korea, the balance of trade and balance of payments had consistently been in deficit
throughout the 1990s and before, while in Taiwan both were in surplus. (Hsiao and Hsiao
(2001))
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Industrial structure context
The difference in the industrial structure of Korea and Taiwan is well known and is
frequently commented on. Taiwan has often been known as the “kingdom of SMEs”, while
Korea is renowned for its conglomerate chaebol structure that emphasises large firms and
often is seen as relegating SMEs to a minor role (Hong, Park and Park (1999)). In practice,
from about 1990 onwards, SMEs played an important and similar structural role in both
economies. SMEs make up over 95 percent of enterprises in both Korea and Taiwan, as they
do in most economies. As can be seen from Table 3, SMEs contributed about 80 percent of
private sector employment in both Korea and Taiwan. This is higher than the APEC average
of around 60 percent. Korean SMEs were smaller than their Taiwanese counterparts,
employing about three or four people, relative to six or seven in Taiwan. There is about one
SME for every 20 people in both Korea and Taiwan, or, put another way, about 5 percent of
the population in each country manages an SME. This is similar to the ratio observed in most
developed economies (Hall (2002b)). The number of SMEs in manufacturing has declined in
both economies, as firms relocate to lower cost manufacturing locations such as China.
Although the industrial structures had grown to be more similar than is commonly assumed,
there remained large differences in the financial flows going to SMEs in the respective
economies. This is dealt with further below.
Table 3: Structural Comparison of SMEs in Korea and Taiwan
1990

1996

2000

Percentage of private employment by SMEs
Korea
Taiwan

78.4
82.3

78.7
82.8

81.9
81.0

Number of persons employed per SME
Korea
Taiwan

4.3
7.0

3.2
6.3

3.3
6.3

Number of people per SME
Korea
Taiwan

20.5
25.3

17.0
20.6

Source: Hall APEC (2002)

Financial structure context
There was a major institutional difference in the financial sectors in Korea and Taiwan,
particularly in regard to the banking sector. Korea’s financial sector was subject to significant
reform as Korea moved to join the OECD in the early 1990s. However, as Hsiao and Hsiao
(2001) observe, quoting Shim ((2000) p 154) the “Korean banks kept lending to chaebols
which the government preferred ... Korean banks ... developed few skills in credit analysis or
risk management, ... Reflecting the history of directed lending, banks generally did not insist
on, or receive, full financial information from chaebols". Similar views are put by Kawaii
(2000), who observes “ While extensive financial sector problems surfaced in the second half
of 1997, the seeds had been sown much earlier. These weaknesses were the result of years of
bad lending practices and an inadequate supervisory and regulatory framework. Problems
included imprudent lending practices, poor credit risk management by banks, poor funding
risk management by borrowers and lax or ineffective oversight by regulators. One important
feature was the close relationship between government, businesses and the financial sector,
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particularly through groups of affiliated businesses known as chaebols. “ The dimension of
the banking problem in Korea can be gauged by the government setting aside some 64 trillion
Won (or about 14 percent of GDP) in 1998 to deal with non performing loans. This has not
proved sufficient to fully deal with the problem.
Taiwanese banks, by contrast, were less concentrated than their Korean counterparts, and,
although this proliferation of relatively small banks has led to the need for rationalisation and
merger, most Taiwanese banks had capital adequacy ratios above the 8 percent BIS (Bank for
International Settlements) requirements. A bad debt and non performing loan problem also
exists in Taiwan, but did not emerge as such until 2000, and represents about 9 percent of non
performing loans as a proportion of all loans, based on official Central Bank estimates.
Annual average overnight call rates in Korea were about double the annual average overnight
call rates in Taiwan up until 1999; Korean rates were about 12 percent relative to about 6
percent in Taiwan. Given the relatively high base rate in Korea it is not surprising that shortterm funds flowed relatively freely to Korean banks in the period up to the Asian Crisis. The
onset of the Asian Crisis led to increases in rates, as shown in Figure 4. Figure 4 averages the
overnight call rates out over a year, so the surge in rates is muted, but it shows that there was
a distinct spike in rates in 1997/98 which was accompanied by a liquidity shortage, especially
affecting smaller firms. Again, Korea was affected much more than Taiwan. The monthly
average overnight call rate rose to a maximum of 25.34 percent in Korea in January 1998,
relative to a maximum in August 1997 in Taiwan of 8.12 percent.
Figure 4: Overnight Call Rates in Korea and Taiwan (%)
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Notes: yearly averages. The peak in Korea in 1997 was significantly higher on a daily basis.
Source: Bank of Korea, Central Bank of China (CBC) Taiwan

Furthermore, there has been a decline in the relative amount of bank finance available to
SMEs in both economies. Figure 5 shows that the proportion of loans to small firms in
Taiwan fell from about 40 percent in 1990 to only 26 percent in 2000. The Korean decline
was from 50 percent in 1995 to 34.5 percent in 2001. The decline in Taiwan is almost linear,
while in Korea the drop in availability of bank credit to SMEs was quite sharp, and occurred
in the immediate post 1997 period.
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Figure 5: Proportion of Bank Loans to SMEs in Korea and Taiwan (%)
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Notes: For Korea, refers to proportion of loans for plant and equipment only.
Source: Korea Small Business Administration www.smba.go.kr, which in turn draws from Industrial Bank of
Korea, Monthly Industrial Bank Survey. Taiwan, MOEA, White Paper on SMEs (various years).

The total volume of bank funds going to SMEs is shown in Figure 6. This shows that the
volume in Taiwan actually increased over the decade to 2000 (even though the proportion
going to SMEs relative to large firms dropped off steadily). In Korea, the volume of bank
funds available to SMEs dropped dramatically in 1998, to only 18 percent of the level in
1995, and by 2001 was still only 40 percent of the level being made available prior to the
1997 Asian crisis.
Figure 6: Index of Total Loans to SMEs in Korea and Taiwan
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Sources: As for Figure 5

In summary, both Korean and Taiwanese SMEs faced a similar business environment up to
the 1997 Asian Crisis, although Korean SMEs were subjected to a less sympathetic financial
environment (Park and Anh (1999)). It can be argued that Korean SMEs generally could be
seen as relatively disadvantaged to Taiwanese SMEs, and especially so in the period
immediately post 1997.
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3. A comparison of the performance of SMEs in Korea and Taiwan
SMEs play an important role in creating jobs, and in building a flexible, adaptable base for an
internationally competitive economy. The performance of SMEs in terms of industrial
renewal, employment creation, export growth and productivity is thus a matter of interest to
policy makers. Measuring and comparing the relative performance of two populations of
SMEs is a difficult thing to do, however, for at least three reasons:
First, it is difficult to operationally measure some relevant variables, such as productivity or
competitiveness. The measures adopted in this paper are proxies for more fundamental
aspects of performance and are intended for use only in a broad overview sense.
Second, it is difficult to obtain reliable and comparable statistics on many variables. The
statistics used here are in the public domain, and are official statistics. As far as is possible
the statistics used are reasonably comparable, but they are not always available for the entire
period desired.
Third, SMEs are very diverse, so the dispersion of the variables can overwhelm some
evidence of underlying features and trends. It would be useful to break the statistics down
into smaller groups (eg by industry, and by firm size), but this is not easily done in a
comparable way.
Subject to these difficulties of measurement, how have Korean and Taiwanese SMEs
performed over the decade? Our second a priori hypothesis is that Taiwanese SMEs might
outperform Korean SMEs simply because the Korean SMEs have been subjected to a more
turbulent and unpredictable business environment (Gregory et al (2002)).
Growth in the total population of SMEs
Net growth in the population of SMEs is a crude indication of the level of entrepreneurial
activity. Figure 7 shows that the total population of SMEs in both Korea and Taiwan grew
roughly in line with GDP from 1991 to the end of the decade. Off an index base of 100 in
1991 the number of SMEs in Korea grew to 132.2 in 1999, while in Taiwan the equivalent
figure was 128.5. While the growth in Taiwanese SMEs followed a steady year to year
increase, the population in Korea dropped quite sharply in 1997 to 1998, from 127.6 to 124.5,
before it bounced back up and overtook the Taiwanese SME population growth.
What is also notable in Figure 7 is the relative stagnation or decline in the number of
manufacturing SMEs. The number of manufacturing SMEs in Taiwan has steadily declined
from an index of 100 in 1991 to 91.7 in 2000. The decline was steady, and commenced in
about 1995. In Taiwan’s case this is probably the result of a process of “hollowing out”
similar to that in Japan, as manufacturers sought alternative low cost manufacturing bases in
Mainland China and elsewhere in Asia. In Korea’s case the available figures suggest a
relatively stagnant manufacturing population, which was hit quite hard in 1997 but which
bounced back quickly by 1999.
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Figure 7: Growth of the Population of SMEs and of Manufacturing SMEs in Korea and
Taiwan
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Note: Index is 1991 = 100 except for Korean Manufacturing SMEs where the index is 1992 = 100.
Sources: For 1990 data, APEC (1994). For data after that Hall, APEC (2002)

Exit rates and bankruptcy rates
Exit rates give another perspective of the corporate population and the performance of SMEs.
High exit rates indicate that many firms are leaving the market. If this is coupled with high
start-up rates then it is an indication of a turbulent economy, with a rapid rate of renewal.
This renewal rate is then a crude indicator of the ability of the economy to adapt to change by
renewing its corporate base. For example, in very crude terms if 10 percent of the population
of firms die each year, and 10 percent are born, it takes only ten years for the whole economy
to be “renewed”. Exit rates are not the same as bankruptcy rates; as a rough guide only about
one firm in ten that exits actually goes bankrupt. SMEs tend to take the brunt of this turbulent
renewal process, and it is a guide as to their performance contribution to the economy.
Unfortunately only limited data are available on exit and bankruptcy rates. Neither Korea nor
Taiwan break down exit or bankruptcy figures by size of firm so we have to assume that the
proportion of SMEs to large firms has not changed in the relevant period, and that most exits
and bankruptcies are SMEs. Korea provides only bankruptcy rates, but Taiwan provides only
exit rates. To try to get some level of comparison, Figure 8 provides estimates of exit rates in
Korea based on an assumption that bankruptcies are 10 percent of all exits.
Although only limited data are available for the two economies, the exit rates are similar. If
we exclude the abnormally low figure in 1999 for Korea the average estimates are about 6.7
percent for both economies, suggesting a crude renewal cycle of about 14 or 15 years. This is
slightly below the 7 percent average exit rate for those APEC economies that have available
data, but much less than the rate of 9.8 percent in the USA (Hall 2002, p 52). Japan, by
contrast, has an exit rate of about 3 percent, slightly above the entry rate of about 2.7 percent,
suggesting the stagnant Japanese economy has a renewal cycle of around 33 years.
The figures for exits in Taiwan have remained relatively steady over the period, even
including the critical Asian Crisis period. Even in 1998 in Taiwan entry rates exceeded exit
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rates, and the firm population grew. Korean exit levels rose steeply in the aftermath of the
1997 crisis period, but fell back to abnormally low levels in 1999.
Figure 8: Exit Rates as a Percentage of all Firms in Korea and Taiwan
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Notes: Exit rates are as a percentage of all firms, not just SMEs. Exit rates for Korea are estimates only; see text
for estimation procedures.
Source: Korea from Hong, Park and Park (1999), and SMBA www.smba.go.kr. Taiwan, MOEA, White Paper
on SMEs (1999).

Exports
The contribution of SMEs to exports is an approximate guide to their international
competitive performance. The contribution of SMEs relative to larger firms is shown in
Figure 9. The Taiwanese data are not from the same series. Estimates of the value of SME
exports up until 1999 were arrived at by deducting large firm exports from the total export
figure; there was no data actually collected from SMEs. Since 1999 the estimates are based
on value added tax data, and the previous estimates are no longer available.
Based on the value added data the contribution of Taiwanese SMEs to total direct exports is
21.6 percent, rather less than the APEC average share of SME exports weighted by the trade
level of 28.2 percent. In Korea, the estimates suggest that SMEs contribute about 40 percent
of exports relative to large firms. What is interesting is that the 1997 crisis did not appear to
have much impact on the relative share of SME exports in Korea or Taiwan. The relative
proportion of exports by SMEs in both economies has stayed steady throughout.
Figure 10 shows the absolute level of exports by SMEs expressed as an index. In Korea, the
rate of growth of exports by SMEs has been strong and steady, growing from an index level
of 100 in 1995 to 157 in 2001. This is almost double the rate of growth of GDP (which grew
to an index of 130 over the same period), and it was only affected slightly by the turbulence
of the 1997 period when, in 1998, the index remained stagnant. It then grew at a catch up rate
in 1999 and 2000. Because of the change in the way the Taiwanese figures are calculated,
only a relatively short series is available which makes comparison difficult. However, off a
base of 100 in 1998, it appears that Taiwanese SME exports shrank to 97.1 in 1999 before
growing to an index value of 111 in 2000. This suggests that Taiwanese SME export
performance is not much better than GDP growth. The preceding series suggests that SME
export growth was stagnant in much of the period to 1999. Part of this relative lack of
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performance of Taiwanese SME exporters may be attributed to the move abroad of
manufacturers, who then export from other countries such as Mainland China.
Figure 9: SME Exports as a proportion of Total Exports in Korea and Taiwan
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Notes: The method of estimating SME exports was changed in Taiwan in 1997, and the series are not
comparable. See text for details.
Sources: For Korea, 1994 - 98 Kotra (1999, p 23), SMBA www.smba.go.kr for 2000 - onwards. 1999 is an
estimate. For Taiwan, Hall APEC (2002) and Taiwan, MOEA, White Paper on SMEs (various years).

Figure 10: Index of Growth of SME Exports in Korea and Taiwan
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Taiwanese series.
Sources: as for Figure 9

Employment
The contribution of SMEs to employment is important in a structural sense and in a dynamic
sense; SMEs provide the vast bulk of all jobs in both Korea and Taiwan. As can be seen in
Figure 11 SMEs contributed on average about 88 percent of total non agricultural
employment in Taiwan, though this has fallen slightly from 89 percent in 1992 to 87 percent
in 2000 with most of the fall being a gradual drop off in the importance of SMEs since 1995.
In Korea, the proportion of employment by SMEs is somewhat less, an average of 76 percent,
and although the available data series is shorter there seems to have been a sharp increase in
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the contribution of SMEs from 73 percent in 1996, to 83 percent in 1999. The 1997 Asian
Crisis does not appear to have had any notable impact on the relative proportion of
employment by SMEs in either economy.
The relative contribution of SMEs in manufacturing is slightly less than that for all industries,
and shows a similar but more muted pattern. SMEs in Taiwanese manufacturing contributed
83 percent of all manufacturing employment, while in Korea the average was about 70
percent. The Taiwanese proportion of SME employment has been declining slightly since
1995, while the Korean contribution has been growing steadily.
Figure 11: Proportion of Employment by SMEs in Total and in Manufacturing in
Korea and Taiwan (%)
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Notes: Figures are percentages of SME employment in relation to all employment in the private sector for Korea
(K) and Taiwan (T), and percentages of SME employment in manufacturing only in Korea and Taiwan (KM and
TM).
Sources: Korea, for 1992 is APEC (1994), for 1996 - 1997, KOTRA (1999), and SMBA (www.smba.go.kr)
after that. Taiwan, MOEA (various years) White Paper on SMEs.

Figure 12 gives the level of SME employment expressed as an index, based on 1992 as 100.
SME non-agricultural employment in Taiwan grew steadily from 1992 to 2000, even though
it shrank relative to large firms. There was a slight decline in 1996, but the 1997 Asian crisis
appears to have had no effect on the contribution of Taiwanese SMEs to employment. Korea,
by contrast, saw SME employment almost stagnant up until 1996, and then it fell sharply
from an index value of 101 in 1996 to a low of 89.6 in 1998 before starting to recover again.
Even though the proportion of Korean employment in SMEs relative to large firms increased
sharply in this period, the total level of SME employment fell. The Asian Crisis thus seemed
to impact on Korean SMEs much more than Taiwanese ones, at least in terms of
employment. However, the Korean SMEs seem to have been more resilient than large firms
in responding to the crisis, and played an important part in providing jobs.
Much the same pattern is evident in the manufacturing industry employment figures.
Taiwanese manufacturing SME employment actually shrank from 1992 to 1996, and then
grew slowly. In Korea there was a steady loss up until 1996 and then sharp loss of SME
employment after 1997, but there was a strong rebound after that which brought
manufacturing employment back to about where it was in 1992.
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Figure 12: Index of Employment by SMEs in Total and in Manufacturing in Korea and
Taiwan
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Notes: Index 1992 = 100.
Sources: as for Figure 11.

Productivity
Improved productivity is an important outcome of innovation. SMEs are often regarded as
innovators. This SME innovation is not necessarily at a basic research level, but more at a
product and process application level. Productivity thus gives some measure of the
performance of SMEs as innovators. Productivity is notoriously difficult to measure, interpret
and compare. Directly comparable measures of productivity improvement are not available
for SMEs in Korea and Taiwan. Korean figures allow measurement of output per employee,
while Taiwanese figures allow measurement of sales per employee. Unfortunately, Korean
figures are only available for manufacturing industry. Figure 13 shows the proportion of
output or sales per employee in SMEs expressed as a proportion of the output or sales of
employees in large firms. It thus gives an approximation of the relative productivity of SME
employees relative to their counterparts in large firms. It would appear that Korean SME
employees produce about 70 percent of the output of their large firm counterparts. By
contrast, the sales per Taiwanese SME employee are only about 10 percent of the sales per
employee of large firms. Although these figures are not directly comparable, the difference is
quite marked and hard to explain. In both Korea and Taiwan, there seems to have been a
slight decline in the performance of SMEs relative to large firms, but in neither case was
there any marked effect from the 1997 Crisis.

14

Figure 13: Approximations of Productivity of SME Employees as a Percentage of
Large Firm Employee Productivity in Korea and Taiwan for All Firms and for
Manufacturing
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Notes: KM and TM refer to Manufacturing. Korean figures are based on output, Taiwanese figures are based on
sales. They are not directly comparable. See text for details. Korean data are not available for all industries;
only manufacturing industry data are available for Korea.
Sources: Korea figures are sourced from Korean Small Business Corporation, and from www.smba.go.kr.
Taiwan MOEA (various years) White Paper on SMEs.

Figure 14 shows manufacturing productivity (measured as sales or output per employee) in
large firms and in SMEs as an index, with 1994 as 100 for Korea and 1992 as 100 for
Taiwan. In Korea it appears that SMEs have kept close track of large firm improvements in
productivity since 1994. However in Taiwan, SME manufacturing productivity has dropped
well below large firm rates of improvement, and, to the extent that comparisons can be
drawn, well below rates of growth of productivity in Korean large and small manufacturing
firms. Taiwanese manufacturing productivity remained rather stagnant in both SMEs and
large firms from 1995 to 1999, when it started to improve sharply again.
Figure 14: Index of Changes in Productivity of SMEs and Large Firms in Korea and
Taiwan for Manufacturing Firms
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Notes: Korea Index 1994 = 100, Taiwan index 1992 = 100. Data are only for Manufacturing.
Sources: as for Figure 13.

15

Debt and current ratios
The ability of SMEs to cope with turbulence, and to provide an entrepreneurial engine of job
creation and innovation, is heavily dependent upon their financial position. The Asian Crisis
made clear that the financial position of firms in Asia, particularly large firms, was less
adequate than it might have been. Ratio analysis is commonly used to interpret the adequacy
of financial performance. Both Korea and Taiwan provide ratio analysis statistics at an
aggregate level, but only two of the statistics are comparable between the two countries; the
current ratio and the debt ratio.
The current ratio gives current assets relative to current liabilities. A ratio of less than 100
indicates that current liabilities exceed current assets, and thus the liquidity of the firm is
poor. Figure 15 shows that in the 1995 to 1999 period,, only Taiwanese large firms had
adequate current ratios. From 1997 Taiwanese SMEs improved their current ratio position
sharply, and Korean SMEs also improved their position although a little more slowly. On the
available figures Korean large firms were still suffering from a poor liquidity position in
1999, and that position had deteriorated, not improved, in the years following the Asian
Crisis.
Figure 15: Current Ratio of SMEs and Large Firms in Korea and Taiwan
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Notes: Current Ratio = current assets/current liabilities. See text for details.
Sources: Korea from www.smba.go.kr. SME Management Indices by Korean Federation of Small Business.
Information on Larger firms from Management Indices by Bank of Korea. Taiwan MOEA (various years) White
Paper on SMEs.

The debt ratio gives the ratio of debt to net worth. The higher the debt ratio the lower is the
ability of the firm to repay those debts out of its long-term assets, after other claims have
been made. A ratio of 300 indicates that debt is 300 percent of net worth. One of the
problems compounding the Asian Crisis was that many firms had acquired debt levels that
they were unable to service. Figure 16 shows that in both Korea and Taiwan, and in both
SMEs and large firms, there was a steady drop in the debt ratios from 1997. Korean firms
generally have a higher debt ratio than Taiwanese, but Korean SMEs were better positioned
to weather out the Asian Crisis in 1996 than their large counterparts.
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Figure 16: Debt Ratios for SMEs and Large Firms in Korea and Taiwan
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Notes: Debt ratio = long term debt/net worth. See text for details.
Sources: as for Figure 15.

4. Policy approaches
In the heat of the 1997/98 period, both economies adopted short term policies aimed at
supporting SMEs (Kawaii (2000)): short term loans to give protection from defaulting
creditors; access to readjustment finance; extended credit guarantee so that SMEs could get
loans at favourable rates, etc. These were similar in many respects in both economies. For
example in 1998 the Japanese Miyazawa initiative made about USD 1.3 billion available for
working capital for SMEs, or about USD 500 for each of Korea’s 2.6 million SMEs, while
Taiwan made about NTD 39 billion available for SMEs, or about USD 600 for each of
Taiwan’s 1.04 million SMEs. In Korea’s case these reforms were also in the context of
broader structural reforms (Shim (2000)). While these policy initiatives may well have eased
the pain a little for SMEs they do not really explain why Korean SMEs have shown such
resilience, and essentially achieved better performance on most indicators over the decade.
Was there some difference in the basic policy framework that might explain the difference?
Taiwan has had a long history of policy support for SME development. This policy has gone
through a number of evolutionary stages, as the economy has developed and needs have
changed (Seong (1995)). Korea has adopted a more ambivalent policy approach, and in the
early 1970s its policy was not sympathetic to SMEs. However, from the early 1980s, Korea
adopted a policy and programs to encourage SME development (Leaven (2002)). The SME
policy framework in Korea and Taiwan differs in some respects but not in any fundamental
way, and has been similar through most of the 1990s. Table 4 summarises the policies
adopted in each economy. This is based on survey results drawn from research carried out for
APEC (Hall (2002) by one of the authors (Hall). It is based on the five broad policy areas
originally identified by the APEC SME Policy Level Group (PLG) as being of particular
relevance to the role of government in developing and implementing SME policy in an open
APEC economy (access to information, finance, technology, human resource development
(HRD), and market access). The tables show a “1” where there is a reasonably clear answer
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of “yes” to the question or criterion indicated in the table. These questions and criteria were
developed in conjunction with senior policy makers. Where there is a blank, it indicates that
the answer is "no” or “insufficient information to tell”. The percentage columns give the
percentage of the APEC economies that responded “yes” to that particular question. There
were 17 economies covered in 1994, and 20 in 2001. The responses are based on official
responses made to the APEC Survey of SMEs carried out in 1994 by Taiwan (Chinese
Taipei), the Survey of Best Practices by Japan in 1995, the SME Profile by Malaysia in 1998,
and a specific survey which was completed by member economy representatives in 2001.
Preliminary results were circulated at the 2001 APEC Ministerial Meeting in Shanghai, and
corrections or comments were sought. Further opportunity for corrections and comments was
given to members at the SME WG Meeting in Vina del Mar in 2002, and at the Ministerial
Meeting in Acapulco in 2002. Whilst there may still be some disagreement with some of the
data for specific policies in specific economies, this gives, as reasonable as possible, a picture
of the policy stances adopted.
Table 4 suggests that there is virtually no difference in the fundamental policy stance adopted
in Korea and Taiwan during the period identified. This is despite there being quite significant
differences across APEC in policy approaches.
Table 4: A Comparison of Policy Approaches to SMEs in Korea and Taiwan, 1994 and
2000
1994

GENERAL
Are policies designed in such a way as to NOT discriminate between
SMEs and large firms?
Are policies designed to discriminate in favour (or against) SMEs or
specific groups (e.g affirmative action for minority or women
entrepreneurs)
Are any programs designed to meet special needs of SMEs (whether
they discriminate or not)?
Are any programs targeted at any particular group of SMEs (e.g SMEs
as subcontractors to larger firms, "picking winners", export oriented
SMEs, etc ?)
Are most programs intended to provide or support a business
environment which encourages globally competitive SMEs?
Is there a basic SME Act or "Magna Carta" which sets out obligations of
govt to SMEs?
Is there an agency or administration within govt with the primary
responsibility for SMEs?

INFORMATION ACCESS
Is there a single point where people can go for advice and referrals on
where to get information about govt regulations etc?
Is there a single portal or entry point for people seeking advice on govt
regulations and requirements?
Is there any govt support for providing firms (including SMEs) with
access to intelligence and information of a non govt nature (e.g market
research, technical information etc)

FINANCE
Is there govt underwriting of credit guarantee for SMEs in domestic
operations?
Is there govt support (including credit guarantee) for SMEs engaged in
exports?
Is there govt support (tax concessions, pooled funds etc) for start-up
and venture companies?
Is there govt support (subsidised or regulated interest rates, etc) for
SMEs or small business generally?
Is there any govt supported program in place to provide micro finance to
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1

1
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1
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6
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those (e.g to ethnic or minority groups) seeking to start a business?
Are SMEs given any concessional or favourable tax rates (e.g special
exemptions on certain taxes, reduced company tax rates etc)?

TECHNOLOGY
Does govt provide any support (tax concessions, access to public
research institutions, public incubators etc) for basic research
Does the govt provide support (incubators, underwriting, network or
cluster support etc) for the commercialisation of innovations or start up
of innovative companies?
Does the govt provide any programs to assist SMEs to adopt
information technology and better management systems
Does the govt provide any programs to encourage the adoption of more
efficient technology (e.g pollution control, manufacturing processes etc)

HRD

18

1

1

1

%
59

1

1

1
1

MARKET ACCESS
Are there export advisory services that are available to firms at less than
full market cost?
Is there govt support (e.g part payment, loans, training etc) for
networking or cluster start up or cooperatives
Are there business matching services provided by govt or supported by
govt?
Is there any legal process or protection for SMEs suffering from unfair
competition, predatory activity etc from large firms?
Is there reciprocal recognition of intellectual property rights (patents,
licenses, copyright, trademarks etc) already established in another
economy?
Are govt agencies required to procure a proportion from SMEs?
Is there govt support for (financial support, infrastructure etc) for
databases to allow large firms and subcontractors to exchange
information and opportunities
Are non-domestic SMEs (i.e. not registered in that economy) able to
access govt procurement or govt sponsored networks (such as credit
guarantee or subcontractor networks)?
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Is there govt support (e.g part payment, loans, facilities, trainers,
facilitators etc) for training or consulting and advice to SMEs?
Is there govt support (e.g part payment, loans, advisors etc) for
providing diagnostic services and advice to SMEs?
Is entrepreneurship or business a required subject in pre university
schooling?
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1
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41
0
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Notes: see text for explanation.
ROK - Republic of Korea
CT – Chinese Taipei (Taiwan)
Sources: Hall APEC (2002)

5. Summary and conclusions
From the foregoing we can surmise that:
•

•

•

SMEs in both Korea and Taiwan were subject to considerable turbulence and
volatility as a result of the Asian Crisis in 1997, and as a more general result of a
number of contextual factors (external debt, interest rates, industrial structure,
exchange rates etc) that they had little or no control over.
Korean SMEs were subject to more turbulence and volatility than their Taiwanese
counterparts, and suffered a relative disadvantage in terms of the business
environment they operated in. Korean SMEs faced higher interest rates, and more
difficulty in getting access to bank finance than their Taiwanese counterparts.
SMEs in both Korea and Taiwan performed similarly in terms of net growth in the
number of SMEs over the entire period, but, as might be expected, Korean SMEs
were hit harder by the 1997 crisis. Korean SMEs then showed considerable resilience
in terms of catching up quickly and then overtaking Taiwan in the post crisis period.
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•

•

•

•

Export performance of SMEs was strong throughout the period, and the 1997 crisis
did not seem to have any noticeable effect on the share of SME exports relative to
larger firms. However, Korean SME exports grew at about double the rate of GDP
growth, while Taiwanese SME export growth appears to be not much better than GDP
growth. Comparison here is made difficult by changes in the series used in Taiwan.
In both economies, SMEs continued to provide the bulk of jobs. However, in Taiwan
large firms outstripped SMEs in terms of job growth. In Korea the reverse was the
case. Even though job growth in SMEs was negative for a short period post 1997,
Korean SMEs generated far more jobs than their large counterparts. In both
economies, manufacturing employment in SMEs was stagnant or declining.
Taiwanese productivity growth in SMEs seems to be falling below large firm
performance, and has been relatively stagnant since the early 1990s, while in Korea
productivity seems to be improving, and SME productivity growth is closely tracking
that of large firms.
Taiwanese SMEs improved their current ratios markedly post 1997. Korean SMEs
also made improvements but not by so much, and the Korean large firms still had
serious cash ratio problems in 1999. Similarly, Taiwanese SMEs had better debt
ratios than Korean SMEs, both before and after the Asian Crisis.

Thus, the first a priori hypothesis is readily accepted. Korea’s SMEs were affected much
more by the immediate aftermath of the 1997 Asian Crisis than those of Taiwan. However,
the evidence seems to contradict the second hypothesis. Although we might expect that
Taiwanese SMEs would outperform Korean SMEs because the latter were subject to more
external impacts and turbulence, the reverse seems to be the case on many indicators.
Certainly the Korean SMEs were substantially affected and had lower performance in the
relatively short period immediately after 1997, but, overall, Korean SMEs seem to be
matching or even outperforming Taiwanese SMEs in all respects bar the financial ratios.
This has some important implications for other economies in the region. The ability to
develop an internationally competitive industrial structure which is able to adapt quickly and
take advantage of opportunities is very important in the face of a turbulent global
environment. What lessons can be drawn from the experiences of Taiwan and Korea?
Resilience is a characteristic of SMEs. Why Korean SMEs performed so well under such
adverse conditions relative to their Taiwanese equivalents can really only be explained by
more detailed research and analysis, but at least some of the explanation seems to lie with the
restructuring of large firms in Korea, and the restructuring of the financial system in
particular, under the auspices of the IMF and World Bank programs. This opened up
opportunities for SMEs that were not so readily available in Taiwan. It also forced many
Koreans from jobs in large firms, and into SMEs.
Both economies, despite some common misconceptions about the relative importance of the
chaebol in Korea, place heavy reliance on SMEs. SMEs play a very important role in the
industrial structure of Korea and Taiwan, and this explains why both economies were able to
weather the storms of 1997 and 1998 so well.
Both Korea and Taiwan had adopted a good basic framework of SME policies and had this in
place by the mid 1990s in Korea’s case, and rather earlier in Taiwan’s case. The policy
frameworks adopted were advanced relative to the APEC average. This seems to have given
both economies a competitive edge when it came to assisting their SMEs to adjust to the
unknown.
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The basic lesson then is that the reputation for SMEs to be flexible in the face of adversity is
well deserved, but should not be take for granted. Turbulence and volatility are not in
themselves necessarily bad. Although the impact of turbulence is no doubt painful for those
directly affected, turbulence can offer opportunities for structural adjustments to take place.
This adjustment process can allow for longer term benefits, and opens up short-term
opportunities by breaking down barriers. Provided the SME sector is able to take advantage
of the opportunities that arise, and provided SMEs have incentives to exit from lowopportunity areas without bearing unreasonable costs, then the SME sector actually seems to
be able to perform better under turbulence. This process is assisted by a good SME policy
framework, which makes it more likely that SMEs can take advantage of the opportunities
created by turbulence.
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